poisoned, and bitter? or a petty subconscious enmity

poisoned, and bitter? or a petty subconscious enmity and rancour against Christianity (and
Plato), that has conceivably never crossed the threshold of consciousness? or just a vicious taste for those elements of life which are bizarre^ painfully paradoxical, mystical, and illogical ? or, as a final alternative, a dash of each of these motives —a little vulgarity, a little gloominess, a little anti-Christianity, a little craving for the necessary piquancy ? But I am told that it is simply a case of old
frigid and tedious frogs crawling and hopping around men and inside men, as if they were as thoroughly at home there, as they would be in a swamp.
I am opposed to this statement, nay, I do not believe it ; and if, in the impossibility of knowledge, one is permitted to wish, so do I wish from my
heart that just the converse metaphor should apply, and that these analysts with their psychological microscopes should be, at bottom, brave, proud, and magnanimous animals who know how
to bridle both their hearts and their smarts, and have specifically trained themselves to sacrifice what is desirable to what is true, any truth in fact^ even the simple, bitter, ugly, repulsive, unchristian, and immoral truths—for there are truths of that description. ^^
All honour, then, to the noble spirits who would
fain dominate these historians of morality. But
it is certainly a pity that they lack the historiccf”GOOD AND EVIL,” “GOOD AND BAD.” ig
sense itself, that they themselves, ar^ quite rie.’^qriherihj by all the beneficent spirits of history. The
whole train of their thought runs, as was always
the ,_way__5r oldTasEiohecf ” pBirosopHefsP^ori
thoroughly unhist6ncaniH5sT”‘thef6~ is n5’ doubt
on~THI5”poinl:r~ TTiS ~ crass ineptitude of their genealogy of morals is immediately apparent when the question arises of ascertaining the origin * of the idea and judgment of ” good.” ” Man
had originally,” so speaks their decree, “praised and called ‘ good ‘ altciiiatic_acts_lrom -the stand- point of those on whom they were conferred, that
is, those_lQjffiJiOJ3i_theyjyere «i’^«</^_subsequently
the origin of this praise was forgotten, and altruistic acts, siniply ‘because, as a sheer matter of
habit, they were praised as good, came also Jp be
felt asgood;;—as though they contained in themselves some intrinsic goodness.” The thing is obvious : —this initial derivation contains already
all the typical and idiosyncratic traits of the English psychologists—we have ” utility,” ” for- getting/’ ” habit,” and finally ” error,” the whole
assemblage forming the basis of a system of values, on which the higher man has up to the present prided himself as though it were a kind of privi- lege of man in general. This pride must be
brought low, this system of values^^Ki^it lose its values : is that attained ? Now the first argument that comes ready to my hand is that the real homestead of the concept
” good ” is sought and located in the wrong place
the judgment ” good ” did not originate among
those to whom goodness was shown. Much20 THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS.
rather has it been the good themselves, that is, the aristocratic, the powerful, the high-stationed, the high-minded, who have felt that they themselves were good, and that their actions were good,
that is to say of the first order, in contradistinction to all the low, the low-minded, the vulgar, and the plebeian. It was out of this pathos of distance that they first arrogated the right to create values for their own profit, and to coin the names of such values : what had they to do with utility? The standpoint of utility is as alien and as inapplicable as it could possibly
be, when we have to deal with so volcanic an effervescence of supreme values, creating and demarcating as they do a hierarchy within themselves : it is at this juncture that one arrives at an appreciation of the contrast to that tepid temperature, which is the presupposition on which every combination of worldly wisdom and every
calculation of practical expediency is always based—and not for one occasional, not for one exceptional instance, but chronically. The]
pathos of nobility and distance, as I have said, the chronic and despotic esprit de corps and fundamental instinct of a higher dominant race coming into association with a meaner race, an
” under race,” this is the origin of the antithesis of good and badj
(The masters’ right of giving names goes so far that it is permissible to look upon language
itself as the expression of the power of the masters : they say ” this is that, and that,” they
seal finally every object and every event with a”GOOD AND EVIL,” “GOOD AND BAD.” 21
sound, and thereby at the same time take possession of it.) It is because of this origin that the word ” good ” is far from having any necessary connection with altruistic acts, in accordance witlW the superstitious belief of these moral philosophers.’ On the contrary, it is on the occasion of the
decay of aristocratic values, that the antitheses between ” egoistic ” and ” altruistic ” presses more
and more heavily on the human conscience—it
is, to use my own language, the herd instinct which
finds in this antithesis an expression in many ways. And even then it takes a considerable time for
this instinct to become sufficiently dominant, for the valuation to be inextricably dependent on
this antithesis (as is the case in contemporary
Europe) ; for to-day that prejudice is predominant,
which, acting even now with all the intensity of an obsession and brain disease, holds that ” moral,”
“altruistic,” and ” d^sint&ess^” are concepts of equal value.
In the second place, quite apart from the fact that this hypothesis as to the genesis of the value
” good ” cannot be historically upheld, it suffers from an inherent psychological contradiction. The ,jitjlity;^j^ ^tjruistic^conduct—has- presumably
origin hap hprnmp fnro-nfUjuj—But in what conceivable way is this forgetting ..po^sitde} Has
perchance the utility of such conduct ceased at some given moment? The contrary is the case. Thjsjitjljty j^gg ra.thpr hppn experienced every day


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